State of the Green Party of Canada, January 2007
In late 2006 Wayne Crookes – Past Chair of the Management Committee and 2004/2005 Campaign Manager for Canada of the Green Party of Canada – was very concerned about the Green Party’s degree of organization in a number of key areas. His report, “The State of the Green Party of Canada, January 2007” follows below. It will be of special interest to members of the Green Party of Canada and other emerging Green parties striving for electoral success.
There are lessons for all Green parties and candidates in this report.
Please click here for a PDF version of the report
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CONFIDENTIAL
Do Not Forward
Declassified on 31 January 2009
Public document: please circulate
to interested Green Party members
This document has been slightly
edited to remove personal information
State of the Green Party of Canada, January 2007
Analysis, Concerns & recommendations
by Wayne Crookes
11 January 2007
Table of Contents
- Executive Summary
- Introduction
- Governance
- Annual Plan – Times a wastin’
- Party finances
- Staff ‘au revoirs’
- Institutional memory and reinventing the wheel
- Transparency and Intellectual Honesty
- Difficult choices – Realpolitik
- Dynamics and tensions of successful political parties
- Policy/Platform
- Policy shifts
- Why vote for the Green Party?
- Election Readiness
- Election Budget
- Election Readiness 2007
- Message
- Expectations
- Blogs and other politically suicidal tendencies
- Volunteers
- Conclusion
- Appendix
- Recommendations
Wayne Crookes 2007, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
1. Executive Summary
The five immediate challenges facing Council and the Federal Campaign Committee (FCC):
- A full slate of candidates
- Council, through the FCC, should now have a spreadsheet available with a minimum of 200 candidates identified (see 7.1), albeit not necessarily nominated by their EDA, for an election in the first 3 months of 2007,
- Screening of these candidates should be well underway,
- Weekly candidate and campaign updates should be provided by the organizing team to the campaign manager, the ED and Council,
- Random reconfirmation of a prospective candidate’s intent should be undertaken, and
- Monitoring, training and support of EDA campaign teams;
- A coherent, consistent message to be communicated by the leader and all candidates;
- A detailed, analyzed election plan and line item budget prior to borrowing;
- Sufficient funds to compete in an election
- Minimum budget of $1 million, not including candidate deposits or matching loans; and
- A qualified and motivated staff, both permanent and election.
The party must focus on developing its ground campaign riding by riding (see 7.2). It cannot continue to rely disproportionately, as it has done in the past, on the air or central campaign to augment its vote and expect to elect MPs. This requires volunteers at the EDA level over the central level; local campaign offices with phone banks; a voter identification and tracking system; and an efficient GOTV effort.
Council should be highly alarmed that it and/or the FCC do not seem to have a draft campaign plan ready for serious review and analysis, messaging, a draught leader’s tour with proposed issues of the day, mock marketing material for the central campaign and templates for candidates, and a line item budget for an election that may be called within weeks.
In preparing the election budget, wishful thinking is not a substitute for sound, independent qualitative and quantitative analysis that is rigorously put to the test and defended before Council. This is not about negative Nellie’s or raining on a parade. It's about prudence. It is far better to spend even 0.5 per cent of $2 million to ensure the integrity of campaign planning assumptions, before spending 100 per cent and finding on Election Day that the assumptions were wrong. Just as there are compliance issues with spending, there are also compliance issues with borrowing.
The Shadow Advocates should be reviewing a draft platform that complements the party’s message to ensure its availability for an early 2007 election. The final draft will require editing, proofing, translation (minimum 5 day turn around with professional translation firms), design and layout, printing, shipping and distribution. Secondly, to what level have the advocates met their responsibilities under the party’s constitution and how many advocates intend to be candidates in the next election? The media relied upon the Shadow Advocates in the 2006 election, but generally only when they were also candidates.
Administratively, the party must employ best practices in its decision making and operations; ensure that the strongest available individuals are in the right position; and recommit to and with staff and senior volunteers. This report is divided into sections with commentary, recommendations and supporting third-party citations. Even if you disagree with some or all of the opinions and recommendations expressed within this report, due diligence requires that you give them appropriate consideration in your deliberations. Your fiduciary duty to the party and its members require you to consider these opinions before you set an election plan in motion.
This report will also be circulated confidentially to some senior party members so that they may share their views on its contents directly with Council.
2. Introduction
This report should be read as the opinion of its author who received input from a variety of former staff and members knowledgeable about the operations of the party and its federal campaigns.
The Green Party will only achieve its full potential when the party is unified and moving forward in the same direction. But even this isn’t enough. Without adequate financial resources, membership development, trained volunteers and experienced, motivated staff the party will be hard-pressed to achieve its electoral potential.
Post-convention party unity has not increased as much as may be apparent or needed. The difference from past experience, however, is that those who no longer feel welcome at the federal level are simply moving to the provincial level or on to other activities. It’s unlikely that they will attack the party publicly as happened in the past. They are not building web sites. Therefore, party disunity is less apparent in the day-to-day activities and life of the party.
I am truly impressed by Elizabeth May’s rapport with the media. Elizabeth has brought panache and policy depth to the leadership of the Green Party of Canada. Leading the Green Party is no easy task and Elizabeth is to be commended for her work and success. However, unless the party is truly united, it will be difficult to capitalize on Elizabeth’s strengths; and capitalize it must.
There is no doubt that the new leader has dramatically increased the party’s media profile particularly on the environment; however, this needs to be juxtaposed with opinion polls (dating to 2001) that show the party as most capable of protecting the environment. The party’s electoral prospects demand equivalent strength on other top-of-mind issues where the party is perceived weaker, such as health care, child poverty, child care, the economy, fiscal and democratic reform.
Paradoxically, Elizabeth’s success also brings risk. The party must prepare for the scrutiny that Elizabeth’s higher profile will bring to the party, its policies and candidates; scrutiny that will be leveled by the media, NGOs and most significantly by other political parties. Potential wedge issues should not be served to the Green Party’s political opponents on a silver platter (see Policy Shifts).
The goal of this report is to ensure that certain issues are in front of and considered by Council as you move forward and others move on. I acknowledge and hope that many of its points may already be under consideration by Council.
From Susan Harada’s chapter* in The Canadian Federal Election of 2006 (Pammett & Dornan):
“They (the Green Party) are being considered more seriously by a good many voters, and they’re being scrutinized more closely by journalists. To not face their choices now would be to risk fading back into the tier of secondary Canadian political parties whence they came.”
Harada, formerly a CBC journalist and now a Communication’s professor at the Carleton University did the GPC a service with her balanced and comprehensive survey of the GPC and some of the challenges we face. She discusses decisions Council will make over the next few years (either with intent or by default).
3. Governance
3.1 Annual Plan – Times a wastin’
The sole priority for Council in the coming months must be election readiness. The likelihood of an early 2007 election may be less than it was, but it is still real. The proposed Annual Plan submitted to Council is sound and its authors are to be commended for their timely work. However, even the best laid plans can be left asunder by the vulgarities of the unexpected: staff resignations, internal conflicts, and external events beyond the control of the Green Party. Council and staff must be flexible to adapt to realities that may, can and will change daily.
Since 2004, Canada has had two successive minority governments. This has meant that the Green Party has been forced to be in a constant state of election readiness. You cannot organize an election during an election; 85 per cent of the result a party obtains in most elections is determined by the work done before the election is called. Council must focus the party’s scarce resources on election readiness, particularly as that election may come within weeks.
There has been much debate on Council regarding a committee structure. To date nothing has been formally decided. Since October 2004, the party has operated on the Message, Money, and Membership model. It behooves Council that for stability alone, this model continues until post-election. Council could enhance this structure with sub-committees, standing committees and ad hoc committees as required where competent volunteers with the appropriate levels of experience are available to serve.
Recommendation: Focus exclusively on election readiness priorities and reconfirm the 3M structure for simplicity and stability. Council should review and reflect on the governance advice and opinions provided by the governance firm Strive that provided a workshop to the former Council and key staff in March 2005.
3.2 Party finances
As the campaign manager has publicly volunteered, the party has cash-flow problems but is “not short of money” (http://blog.greenparty.ca/en/node/450). Cash-flow is an on-going challenge that the party has faced since the June 2004 election. This is partially the consequence of successive minority governments, the party’s constant need to be in a state of election readiness, and the reality that the party has had to borrow to finance each election, as it will again. The Revenue Sharing agreement also necessitated either staff cuts or significantly increased fundraising by the central party. However, the agreement was implemented at the start of the 2006 election when cuts were impractical and funds raised were immediately dedicated to the campaign. Central fundraising also remains a point of on-going controversy within the party.
The new leadership team has implied to some party members that the outgoing Council is responsible for leaving the party in a dire financial situation. However, it should be noted that 2006 revenue is running ahead of 2005 in both fundraising and Elections Canada financing. After 9 months, the party was on track to raise over $500,000 in 2006, with Elections Canada providing an additional $224,000. In 2003, the party’s total revenue was $296,773.
Fundraising *
2005 $409,357
2006 $405,200 (first 9 months of 2006)Note: If 2006 fundraising remains on track the party is forecast to raise a record $540,000.
* Figures are before transfers from EDAs
Elections Canada financing
2005 $1,018,932
2006 $1,243,468 (est.)
Coincidently, the increase in Elections Canada financing is sufficient to have covered the alleged convention costs in full, without any offsetting revenue whatsoever, and still leave a surplus of nearly $15,000. Indeed, the allegation regarding convention spending jeopardizing the next federal election does not seem to have prevented the party from finding funds to pay severance to former staff members, run a fully-funded LNC byelection campaign, or increase the number of FTEs on staff.
2006 was a difficult year. The party financed and oversaw an election and its wrap-up, administered a major leadership and Council race, held a convention described by the media as the party’s ‘coming of age’, hosted two policy forums, ran a fully-funded byelection, all on top of its regular day-to-day work. Searching for scapegoats may be useful politically; however, it does little to unify the party or develop sustainable solutions. In fact, it does quite the opposite.
Financial questions for Council:
- What was the party’s monthly payroll in October 2005 (excluding election staff if any) and October 2006?
- What is the forecast January 2007 payroll?
- How many new posts since the convention have been filled through open hires and how many through closed hires?
- Has the party been able to meet the conditions of its loan agreements with its creditors?
- What is the projected cost (direct and indirect) of the regional policy forums currently underway; what cost-recovery plans are in place for these forums through registration fees or other charges; and how does Council justify this expense without any specific attempt at cost recovery while the leader criticizes convention spending in the same regard?
- When will holdbacks in Revenue Sharing due to cash flow problems be overcome?
- What percentage of the leader’s time is currently dedicated to fundraising?
- In this context, what overall impact has Council’s decisions had on party finances since 27 August 2006?
Recommendation: The party’s current financial situation cuts both ways. It is imperative that the party live within its means and that its leadership stops trying to assign blame over past decisions when current choices could just as easily be singled out for criticism.
3.3 Staff ‘au revoirs’
The party has lost at least four senior staff since the convention. Undoubtedly, other staff members are considering their options. Only 14 staff members remain who worked for the Green Party in the 2006 election, and only 7 of those worked for the party in the 2004 election. In thirty months, the party has lost nearly two thirds of its permanent election staff. As of this report, only two party organizers remain from 2004 and only one member of the original media team.
This does not bode well for the party on the eve of a federal election, particularly as there is no guarantee that the remaining staff will be with the party in three months. Not only do vacancies require suitable candidates and training, but the party also needs to identify potential election staff. The party still has an interim appointee on staff. Indeed, the Director of Communications vacancy has been posted to the main page of the party’s web site since June 2006.
The party has lost the equivalent of eleven election cycles in Federal Campaign Committee experience with the voluntary or forced resignations of seven individuals who served on the FCC in 2004 and 2006. Over half will not be available in the next election, even if the current leadership were inclined to seek their support.
Other parties are now ramping up their staffing as they prepare for a possible election from applicants who in many cases have over ten years of electoral experience and have already begun to place orders for election materials. Council must ask: why so many senior staff and former volunteers who served honourably are simultaneously heading for the exit when party polling is so encouraging?
From Marc-André Gadoury, Journal de Montréal (November 2006):
«J'espère qu'elle va perdre sa job», tonne-t-il. «Sinon, c'est sûr que ce qui vient de se passer ne paraîtra pas bien à son évaluation annuelle», de dire celui qui a été candidat pour les verts à l'élection de janvier dernier dans le circonscription montréalaise de Rosemont-Petite-Patrie. «
I hope she loses her job », he (Gadoury) thundered. « If not, it’s certain that it’s not going to look good on her annual evaluation ».
Staff must feel that they work in a safe, tolerant environment and must be protected by their employer from all forms of harassment – internally and publicly. The party has a legal obligation to protect its staff from harassment and employers that do not do so risk facing legal consequences and higher staff turnover rates. The party also has a moral obligation to protect its members and volunteers. Staff and volunteers must feel valued by their employer, and the party.
Since the 2004 election, the party has operated under five different management structures. Since September 2005, the party has gone through three Executive Directors (two interim) and is now on its fourth. It is January 2007.
The party is still coming to terms with its role as an employer. However, like any employer a high staff turnover rate does not bode well for the success of an organization.
Recommendation: Just as party members asked of the ERCT, all hires should be through an ‘open hire’ process and Council would be advised to seek independent counsel in conducting exit interviews of staff as they resign and staff who have recently resigned.
Note: The ERCT was the Election Readiness Campaign Team, the precursor to the Management Committee which itself was the precursor to the Executive Director.
3.4 Institutional memory and reinventing the wheel
With the loss of staff and volunteers, the party is losing its institutional memory to the extent that it was able to build that memory. The loss of this invaluable resource results in many activities being undertaken that may have already been done and simply need to be updated or improved upon. Council should appreciate that not everything that took place under the former Council or staff needs to be discarded.
Recommendation: Council or the FCC need to communicate with those who may still be available to ensure that before funds are committed to a project that the project has not already been completed and simply requires updating or enhancement.
For instance, a volunteer has been assigned to prepare “Facts for Candidates” as a briefing tool. Hopefully, the FCC has reviewed the existing candidate briefing material prepared prior to and during the 2006 election to avoid unnecessary duplication.
Equally, there has been discussion regarding templates for candidate material such as signs, brochures, etc. Presumably, the FCC has reviewed the Campaign on a CD and other training material which can be found at http://multimedia.greenparty.ca to ensure that work is not duplicated and enhancements made only as required and then only in a manner that is compliant with the Elections Act. One hopes that the fundraising material prepared for EDAs is also still available.
Prior to finalizing the www.demanddemocraticdebates.ca campaign, did the party consider the intelligence gleaned from personal relationships that were being developed with the broadcast consortium by the party post-January 2006? To what extent was the consortium’s advice to the party taken into account in the development of this on-line campaign? Does Council even know that face-to-face meetings were held between the party and the consortium following the last election?
Finally, as Council approves an election plan it must ensure that the information provided by the FCC accurately reflects past experience and is appropriately questioned and analyzed (see Election Readiness).
Recommendation: Despite the rap some wish to level at the previous leadership team, much was accomplished and remains readily available. However, lines of communication must be open, positive and constructive to maximize the benefits of this work and experience.
3.5 Transparency and Intellectual Honesty
Council decided at its first retreat to provide what some term an “amnesty” as a means to heal divisions in the party. But this amnesty was one-sided. There was no quid pro quo. Specifically, an Ombuds Report on Kate Holloway was quashed, but there was no requirement for Ms. Holloway to apologize or remove public postings that she has made over the last two years against many in the party: members, volunteers, donors and staff.
Ms. Holloway campaigned on a platform of transparency: “As Chief Agent, I commit to doing the following: I will transform the GPC into a transparent, accountable Green Party…”
In fact, it was Ms. Holloway who asked for the Ombuds investigation that Council later chose to cover-up. Ms. Holloway also set strict conditions on the work of the Ombuds Committee and the scope of their investigation. Later on 10 September 2006, Ms. Holloway wrote in an e-mail to Council: "Of course we should be listening to our Ombuds before we make decisions."
After being at the centre of a great deal of party controversy for two years, Kate Holloway resigned from the Green Party to join the Liberal Party. However, her attacks against party members and staff remain widely posted in cyberspace. These postings have already created difficulties for former staff as they seek new opportunities.
Some have tried to estimate the cost of party disunity, both in dollars, volunteer hours and lost volunteers. Regardless of the amount that some may peg this figure at, it is considerable. The price of dysfunction – members being turned against members, members against staff, and reputations attacked – has had a serious impact on the work of the party, inter-party relationships and lost opportunities.
While some in the party believe that membership provides a behavioural carte blanche, the experiences with Ms. Holloway should prove otherwise. Council has a duty to members to be transparent, as Ms. Holloway herself campaigned on. To do otherwise, means that future Councils will not readily have the wisdom available to prevent reoccurrences of these patterns of dysfunctionality.
Recommendation: Membership has responsibilities. Council must implement a fair, efficient and open process to discipline party members appropriately if and when required. To do otherwise invites continued internal dissent.
3.6 Difficult choices – Realpolitik
While the leader talks about doing politics differently, undoubtedly a shared desire of many Canadians, one aspect of politics will forever remain the same. A political party exists to win votes, seats and ultimately government. The Green Party’s constitution is clear: it is a political party. It is not an activist NGO. And like its competitors, the party must focus on the basics: voter contact and identification, GOTV, message, membership development and fundraising.
Sadly, hype is not a substitute for hard work. Nearly 200 ridings had 25 or less paid-up members as of September 2006. It has always been difficult and remains so to ascertain how many ridings are actually “active”: raising funds, building membership, interviewing prospective candidates, training election volunteers, etc. Although party membership has doubled, fewer members voted in the Green Party leadership race than there are Liberal members solely in the Montréal-area riding of Bourassa. There’s much work to do.
While Elizabeth and her team are to be congratulated for the London North Centre (LNC) byelection result, it is unlikely that the party can repeat this result nationally or even in a subsequent byelection such as Outremont, due to the party’s insufficient human and financial capital. LNC volunteers came from across Canada and donors were focused on one byelection. Without developing the party’s ground campaign, it is difficult to imagine that this result can be repeated in many – if any – ridings in the upcoming general election when the party will be running 308 simultaneous campaigns. In particular, the NDP will run an extremely aggressive negative campaign at the grassroots level, even more so if a byelection occurs prior to the general election.
And should there be a byelection prior to the next election the perception bar for the party will be high and falling short risks losing the momentum and traction that was earned from London North Centre.
In the last three years, the party has managed on many occasions to lose focus, to divert resources from pressing priorities to internal divisions and process minutia, it has been forced to defend itself against complaints filed by party members with Elections Canada, and replace staff who were harassed or burned-out.
The management of a political party with limited resources involves making difficult choices and accepting the criticism for those decisions. But above all it requires making those choices in a timely manner based upon the most competent advice and analysis available.
Recommendation: The party does not have the resources to do everything and must focus its capacity on the tactics that will bring about the best result for the party based on its current quantitative strengths.
3.7 Dynamics and tensions of successful political parties
Tensions exist in all organizations. It is how those tensions are managed that determines the ultimate success of an organization. The Green Party is still finding its way in this regard, mistakes were made in the past and are still being made. The Green Party is really only a 32 month work in progress. But even in 32 months much has been accomplished, both under the previous leadership team and Elizabeth’s team.
In order for the party to reach its full potential, a system of ‘checks and balances’ must be encouraged – at all levels of the party; no one is ever right 100 per cent of the time: the Leader, Council, Advocates, staff or members. In most political parties, an elected caucus acts as important check on the power of the leader. Council, at least in the short-term, must compensate for the absence of a caucus and ensure that its internal systems of checks and balances are extensive and function effectively.
It will do so by ensuring that strong, qualified staff are selected, supported and protected; that the leader works with an ‘inner core’ known to Council of diverse, trusted advisers; and that Council exercises its authority when necessary. Successful political parties need a strong leader, a strong Council led by a strong Chair, a strong Executive Director and a strong Campaign Manager.
Professional advice must not only be sought, but more often than not heeded. And internal party processes that include strong checks and balances will help reduce the instances when someone or some group is not right 100 per cent of the time.
Recommendation: Council must show its willingness to act as a check and balance on the political arms of the party and encourage the new ED to develop administrative checks and balances for staff.
4. Policy/Platform
4.1 Policy shifts
The most notable reported shifts in party policy by the leader are on the following issues:
Senate Reform – Leader opposed (G&M), party policy supports
Seal hunt – Leader partially supports (CBC), party policy opposes
Abortion – (See below)
Québecois as Nation – (See below)
However, it’s Elizabeth’s comments on abortion (see also ‘Blogs and other politically suicidal tendencies’) that have created the most reaction across Canada, and her position on the motion recognizing the Québecois as a nation among Québec party members.
One of the costs of party leadership is the capacity of the leader to deviate significantly from party policy. While a candidate can and might say “the GPC policy is…but my personal view is…” the leader does not always have the same luxury or flexibility since she/he speaks on behalf of the entire party and not just her/his candidacy or personal views. When the leader needs that flexibility for personal reasons, it needs to be exercised prudently. Sadly, this was not the case with Elizabeth’s comments on abortion.
The reaction over these comments has in many ways become a debate over how many angels could fit on the head of a needle versus the common perception of certain key phrases within her response. Some argue her comments suggest the party is anti-choice, others the opposite. What is clear, however, is that Elizabeth’s original words could have been far more carefully chosen or nuanced and this issue quickly killed with an apology or clarification for those specific words and their effect at muddying the intent of her original response.
From Elizabeth May
http://politicsblog.ctv.ca/blog/_archives/2006/12/11/2566201.html
“So if one group of people say, "A woman has a right to choose," I get queasy, because I'm against abortion. I don't think a woman has a frivolous right to choose. Abortions are legal because they must be to avoid women dying. But nobody in their right mind is for abortions. I've talked women out of having abortions. I would never have an abortion myself, not in a million years. I can't imagine the circumstances that would ever reduce me to it.”
From Toronto Now
“Choosing her words quite poorly, May has inflamed the blogosphere by saying "no one in their right mind would want to have an abortion - and that she doesn't think women "have a frivolous right to choose.”
From Elizabeth May
“Anything on this issue can, and will, be taken out of context. My own views and those of the party are the same. In fact, I think the best summation of both was Bill Clinton's "Abortion should be safe, legal and rare."
Thanks for your thoughts.”
Bill Clinton’s comments do not reflect what Elizabeth May said. Party policy does not include the use of the term ‘frivolous’ or question the sanity of those who support a woman’s right to choose. Equally, former President Clinton competed in a two party system in a significantly different political environment. It is difficult to imagine that any analytical or qualitative research recommended that the party reopen this debate for electoral gain.
Secondly, the Green Party now has the distinction of being the only major federal party that is opposed to the motion recognizing the Québecois as a nation. Council needs to ask whether taking a stand on this motion was actually necessary and, if so, whether this was the stand to take? A middle ground was easily available to oppose the motion simply on the grounds of the lack of definitions and its linguistic exclusionary approach while still acknowledging the need to recognize Québec consistent with party policy. Most importantly, were Québec party members extensively consulted before this position was taken?
The leader’s stated desire “not to be scripted” is a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. Her comments on abortion are one of those instances. The party risks being taken seriously off message if similar incendiary interventions are made by the leader or senior spokespeople during the election.
The leader is the chief spokesperson for the Green Party of Canada and as such must express her personal opinions with care and even on occasion with qualification and nuance. Every word that Elizabeth now utters will be scrutinized by the media and other political parties. Is the party really ready for six or ten times the scrutiny than it witnessed in 2006?
Recommendation: The leader requires an ‘inner core’ who she trusts, feels comfortable with, and who are known to party members. Their advice should be heeded more often than not. The stronger and more experienced the better and, if effective, it will be rare when the leader will reject their advice. Council needs to ensure that an ‘inner core’ is in place and functional.
4.2 Why vote for the Green Party?
During the 2004 election campaign the Green Party was attacked both by observers and members for a platform that was perceived as being ideologically right of centre. The 2006 party platform was intended to address this criticism by moving the platform gently towards the political centre and ensuring that it also more accurately reflected party policies as adopted by party members.
The result of that shift was a more widely acclaimed platform (see Sierra Club Report Card) and a more critic-proof document.
However, since the party leadership convention, new policy stands have been taken that have moved the party (on some issues) even further to the right than in 2004 or put the party out-of-step with its presumed target constituencies. Some of the leader’s recent comments could best be described as appealing to the former Reform Party base.
Political positioning is not an exercise in political ping pong.
The party can not continue to radically shift its policy stands without losing credibility with voters and the media. If the party wants to earn the trust of Canadian voters it has a duty to be clear and forthright as to where the party stands on the important issues facing Canada and remain steadfast to those positions between elections as best as circumstances will allow.
From Babble.ca
“That is definitely one element of their "vote" and I don't have a problem with that. I'm just concerned that there may still be a lot of Birkenstock wearing starry eyed 20-somethings who have this crazy idea that just because a party has the proper name "Green" is must be some European style Green Party full of pacifists and vegans and animal rights activists etc... and that it is on the far left. If people understand what the Canadian Green Party REALLY stands for and they still want to vote for it - I have no objection. But people should vote for them (or not) for the right reasons.”
Recommendation: The Shadow Advocates must play a larger role in working with party members to flesh out party policies and ensure ideological consistency between election cycles.
5. Election Readiness
5.1 Election Budget
While anything is theoretically possible on paper, it is difficult to imagine the party competing seriously in the next election with a budget of less than $1 million; and this does not include a fund for candidate deposits or matching loans. While Council is considering approving borrowing of up to $4 million, such approval would still be dependent upon available and willing lenders. If repaid over four years as some suggest, it may require finding lenders not once, but at least twice.
Regardless of the amount of the final budget, these funds need to be secured prior to the writ either through dedicated donations or loans. A full or partial ‘pay as you go’ plan during the election is impractical.
In all likelihood the next campaign will be 36 to 40 days and not fifty-five, as was the 2006 election. The draft budget should account for this difference, including but not limited to expenses related to the Leader’s Tour and payroll. The party will not have the luxury of time during the election to organize and finance its campaign as it did to some extent in 2006.
As well, it is difficult after the second week of a 36 day campaign to spend additional funds wisely over and above the original budget. If the party plans to rely on possible excess contingency funds, prior to the writ it must develop specific uses for such funds and kill dates as to when spending additional monies will have no real electoral impact.
For instance, the timeline for printing coroplast signs can be up to 14 days, not including shipping or erecting. While pre-existing artwork for a brochure can be printed within a week, the party needs to account for shipping (even with regional printers) and then door-to-door distribution (volunteers/Canada Post). The frequency of radio or TV ads would be somewhat easier to augment, if the ads were already produced. In the 2006 election, coroplast and bag signs were ordered and paid for prior to the writ.
Most election expenses are cash in advance or COD. The party will need to have sufficient funds available to pay deposits and invoices as they are due and delivered.
In 2006, the cost for a 30 second radio ad on ‘As it Happens’ was $1,847 plus taxes, not including production or possible voice talent. This is comparable to the cost of a 4/5th page ad in Toronto NOW. However, to be effective the party would need to buy a minimum of 30 ads just on CBC Radio over a 10 day period. If the party is going to consider even a minimal national advertising campaign, the budget must be set and the funds available prior to the writ. The party would also be well advised to seek professional, independent ad agency counsel before approving any national advertising campaign plan or major marketing expenditure.
The party will require experienced, full-time, committed election staff that are interviewed and selected prior to the writ. Many of the staff in the 2006 election, particularly on the media and organizing teams often worked 16 to 20 hour days, including Christmas Day. These positions simply cannot be filled by volunteers, who may have careers or families, regardless of how committed or talented they may be. Equally, the party needs to satisfy itself that it is in compliance with the Elections Act in respect to professional volunteers.
Recommendation: Council must set a practical, realistic budget and ensure that the funds are available prior to the writ. Borrowing must be based on sound polling analysis, a line item election budget, and justifications for each electoral scenario presented to Council. Council will need to consider the likelihood that Canadians may elect a third minority government and such an outcome’s budgetary impact on post-election party operations.
5.2 Election Readiness 2007
An election plan is not a science fiction script. Council needs to ensure that any plans it approves are based on the best available information. If pre-planning research was only focused on the opinions of one party faction from the last campaign operating with partial information, its findings may be flawed or biased. For instance, the campaign manager is on record as stating:
“Messaging for Quebec was a HUGE problem in the last campaign. We will need to build a team that will message specifically for Quebec.”
In fact, Québec had its own messaging team in 2006 with three-fourths of the four member team comprised of candidates put forward by the party’s grassroots and taking direction from local candidates, where that direction was consistent and compatible with federal messaging. The party’s election message can not be federalist in English Canada and separatist in Québec. Therefore, it was a priority to ensure that messaging was consistent in both languages.
Québec also had a mini-tour for its key spokesperson Claude Genest. The team organized two rallies in Québec during the election with Jim Harris and received significantly more (positive) media coverage than the party did in 2004. In fact, Jim noted that on one day alone during the 2006 election he did more Québec media than was done throughout the entire 2004 campaign.
The primary internal problem in Québec was not a messaging team, but the media team’s choice of messenger. The media team relied upon (xxxxxxxxxxxx and not xxxxxxxxx) This choice was influenced by professional considerations and the private advice of the Québec news media. It was a difficult decision. But to misrepresent the problem as the campaign manager has will potentially result in the wrong solution.
The campaign manager also recommended:
“Since press conferences happen in the morning and grassroots events happen in the evening if the leader can travel in the dead time of the afternoon they will.”
In an election, there are generally four news cycles during a 24 hour period (the evening rally often accounting for one of those cycles). There are no “dead times”. By having up to three complementary issues per day plus a rally or grassroots event, the leader can maximize media coverage during the tour. The tour needs to take into account the scheduling of other party leaders when they’re in the same media region. It needs to consider time zones and the up-link capacity of local and regional electronic media in its traveling assumptions. Finally, by proposing to travel during the “dead time of the afternoon” the leader will not be available for mid-day talk radio and afternoon drive to promote an evening rally or the party’s message.
In the last election, it was not uncommon to have two or three media events in different cities on the same day. For instance on one day, Jim did a morning news conference in Vancouver followed by an afternoon news conference in Victoria and a media event in the evening; on another he did a morning news conference in Jonquière, a mid-day news conference in Québec City and evening media events in Montréal; and on another he mainstreeted in Edmonton in the morning, gave a lunch time speech in Regina and then an evening rally in Calgary. This was intended to maximize the party’s media coverage with local, regional and national media. The party also purchased carbon offsets to compensate for the GHG emissions generated by the Leader’s Tour.
These are two examples of many where Council needs to ensure that the inputs it receives from the campaign manager and the FCC are accurate before it approves a campaign plan and budget. Experience was gained during the last two elections, including with the organization and logistics of two Leader’s Tours. The party should capitalize on that experience where it may still be available. By retaining as much institutional memory as possible, Council will have a better opportunity to ensure its decisions reflect the best possible information available.
A good test of the campaign plan, its inputs and budget would be to ask whether you are prepared as a member of Council or the FCC to personally guarantee a share of the party’s election borrowings.
Questions for the FCC:
- What level of financial support is projected for key ridings and when will this support be pledged (see note below) and delivered (money spent in the first week of the campaign has six times the value than if spent in the last week)?
- What objective, analytical criteria will be used to identify these ridings?
- Will candidates be receiving signs, brochures and platforms from the central campaign and when will this decision be communicated to EDAs/candidates (what is the projected ‘E minus Day’ estimated time of arrival and will a staff person be assigned to manage the logistics)?
- What level of advertising campaign can the central campaign support?
- Will a fund be available for candidate deposits and how will that fund be allocated?
- Will the party make arrangements to ensure that the campaign manager is based in Ottawa for the campaign as other parties do?
- How many paid election staff will each unit of the campaign have available?
- When will they be selected and hired?
- Based on past experience is this staffing level sufficient?
- Will there be a Leader’s Tour, in what form, and with what size advance team?
- Has the advance team been identified and what experience do they have?
- How many Shadow Advocates will not be candidates in the upcoming election and does the FCC recommend that they be replaced?
- To whom has Council given the authority to negotiate and approve possible electoral alliances with other parties for the upcoming election and when and how will this be communicated with the concerned EDAs?
- While some of the above questions are based on the party’s capacity to borrow, does it have lenders willing to lend?
- And will former lenders be prepared to vouch for the party’s moral and financial integrity?
Note: Andrew Lewis is able to discuss the benefits of additional funds being available at the start of a campaign versus in the final week.
Recommendation: If there are significant changes to election plans and resources for the upcoming election this information needs to be communicated with EDAs and candidates as soon as possible. And in approving campaign plans: the inaccuracy of any inputs will be directly proportionate to the inaccuracy of the outputs.
5.3 Message
The party’s federal message must be consistent with regional messages and vice-versa; otherwise the party invites needless media scrutiny during the election. This is particularly the case with messages delivered in English and French or in Québec and English Canada (see NDP candidate Maria Peluso 1988). Like all parties, the Green Party has a delicate messaging task – internally and externally – as it attempts to appeal to right of centre voters and members in some regions of the country, left of centre voters and members in others, and Québec party members who include sovereigntists, nationalists and federalists.
The party would be well-advised to undertake as much polling analysis as its operating budget will allow as soon as possible in the development of its election message, campaign plan and budget. The party may not be able to afford custom polling, but it can invest in an analysis of existing polling data. This was done prior to the 2006 election and it would be a mistake not to do so again. The polling data allowed the party to target specific regions for the Leader’s Tour to maximize the campaign’s impact and helped identify key issues for the campaign. Election results supported these assumptions.
Equally, a focus group of voters who identify the Green Party as their second choice would be highly beneficial in the development of the party’s messaging.
The former Director of Communications set out four internal goals for the 2006 election:
- Hold 2004 vote
- Move second choice voters to GPC first choice voters
- Move considers to second choice
- Increase pool of considers
Each of these goals was achieved, despite some party members who worked tirelessly to derail the campaign, including a recently appointed member of the Shadow Advocates.
As noted by Susan Harada in The Canadian Federal Election of 2006 (Pammett & Dornan): "Final results showed the party had pulled off something remarkable - it held on to its vote".
New goals that are objectively attainable must be set in the campaign plan.
From George Read:
“Locations and issues are already being collected as part of the 36 day plan. The Leader will speak on our issues minimizing the concern that we will be over run by the other parties’ issue of the day.”
From Patrick Gossage:
“However, although you have a fully thought out platform, the media’s view of what is important to the electorate is framed by issues in current dispute both federally and provincially more than by the issues newcomers say are important.”
Despite the party’s best intentions, it will fight the next election not on the issues that party members deem important, but the issues that the media will choose to focus on as determined by polling, the public agenda and the Green Party’s political competitors. This is one of the reasons why Elizabeth is earning more pre-election national media coverage than Jim Harris did. Fortunately for the party, the predominant pre-election issue today is the environment. Prior to the last election, it was the Gomery Inquiry which was correctly perceived by the media as not being a primary Green Party strength.
From Susan Harada in The Canadian Federal Election of 2006 (Pammett & Dornan):
“As he made his way from province to province, Harris tailored his messages to his audiences. He launched three of the party’s mini-platforms from carefully chosen locations. In Iqaluit …he announced the Green Party’s Kyoto plan. From Windsor, where air pollution is a major issue, he released the national cancer strategy. And in Calgary, a city built on oil, the party’s national energy platform was unveiled.”
Recommendation: The party needs to invest in quantitative and qualitative research in the development of its election message and prior to the approval of a campaign budget.
5.4 Expectations
This past weekend Elizabeth stated on the CBC that she was “prepared to say we’re going to win lots of seats.” Despite the bravado, it would be difficult if not impossible to identify those seats. And the media will ask. Indeed, there may only be a handful of seats where the party will be competitive and then only with fully-funded and fully-staffed (volunteer) campaigns.
One of the strategic errors in the last campaign was a consistent effort to raise expectations by the leader, against the advice of senior counsel. The internal goals (see above) were met, but the party fell far short of the leader’s external goals and paid a price particularly with party members who were disappointed with the result.
The party’s leadership must lower expectations and then exceed them, rather than raising expectations and falling short. Peter Lougheed consistently and very successfully campaigned as the underdog, despite polls and conventional wisdom that indicated otherwise.
While many in the party are pointing to the polling results from Decima, Environics and Strategic Counsel for morale and strategic purposes, Ipsos Reid and SES continue to have the party at 5 per cent. In 2005, the party also polled higher with Strategic Counsel, but the numbers fell off immediately after the writ as ‘parking lot voters’ made their election choice. In fact, it was in 2005 – under Jim Harris – that the party realized its’ highest ever result with Strategic Counsel at 10 per cent.
The party needs to consider the methodology employed by each firm in calculating results. Even if the party relies for budgetary purposes on higher numbers, these figures do not reflect the commitment level of those voters. This analysis is available and should be relied upon in any borrowing decision.
From the National Post (8 January 2007):
Political and public opinion analysts, however, play down the Green party's potential threat. "You have to wonder how much of the Green party is smoke and how much is fire," Mr. Darrell Bricker, president of polling firm Ipsos Reid says, noting one strong showing in a byelection does not make a political trend. He adds polling indicated Green party supporters -- roughly 4.5% in the last election-- tend to be young, less attached to politics and, most importantly, the least likely to vote.
Finally, the party still does not have the strength to identify and pull its vote, as encouraged by SES. In the last election, the former Director of Communication set out to reverse the polling trend from the 2004 election where the party polled high at the beginning of the campaign and progressively fell. In 2006, the reverse occurred. The party started low and built support. By the final weekend of the campaign, the party was polling as high as 7 per cent with Strategic Counsel (coincidentally where the party was last month) and 6.1 per cent with SES, but local campaigns were not able to pull that extra vote.
From The Canadian Federal Election of 2006 (Pammett & Dornan):
“79% of those who did not cast a vote for one of the big four parties in 2006 made their decision during the campaign and especially in its closing days.”
From http://www.kamloopsthisweek.com:
The B.C. Green party jumped to 16 per cent support in the December Ipsos-Reid poll, which is odd given that the biggest news from the party since the 2005 election was the departure of Adriane Carr.
Back in the 2005 B.C. election campaign, I expected success for the Greens, with the public looking for opposition voices.
Carr couldn’t make a breakthrough, and has now moved on to the federal scene and a deputy leader job, no doubt financed by the Green party’s $1-million windfall under new federal-election financing rules.
It must have been embarrassing for Carr to see the B.C. party’s popularity double after she was replaced by nobody. But the result says more about the fluidity of public opinion between elections. (Underlining added)
From GPC Blog:
18% of 26% may not be a landslide win Submitted by Donald E. Fletcher on 19 November 2006 Lambton-Kent-Middlesex EDA
If 26% see environment as the most important issue, and we get 18% of them voting Green can we do some math to figure out what our base popular vote might be? Is it even as high as the 9% we have been polling? If not, perhaps we are starting to be perceived as other than a one issue party. We may need to work on that perception, offer a chicken in every pot and a little pot with every chicken? If 26% have the environment as their #1 concern and 18% are voting Green, then about 5% (0.26 x 0.18 = 0.0468) should be voting Green. That is coincidentally about the same percentage the GPC had at the polls from the last election.
The Math, the message, the positioning Submitted by Jim Harris on 20 November, 2006
If we can show that there is only one party that you can vote for that will make a significant difference on the environment -- the Green Party -- and that voting for any other party would be undermining the environment -- then we should work to get 100% of the 26% of Canadians who see the environment as the #1 issue. Of course we won't get 100% but we should work to do it. We should also work to convince them to get their parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters, who don't see the environment as the #1 issue yet to vote for the Green Party. When you have more than 1/4 of the population on your side they can in turn leverage their networks. It's a Trippi style philosophy.
This shifting attitudes of Canadians puts the Green Party in the strongest position we have ever been in.
Recommendation: As John Diefenbaker said: “polls are for dogs”. The party must lower expectations and then exceed them, not the reverse.
5.5 Blogs and other politically suicidal tendencies
During the LNC byelection, the leader responded to a question on abortion (discussed above) that ignited a minor but needless cyberspace debate over the party’s policy on this emotionally-charged issue. However, the fact that the GPC/LNC campaign team clandestinely taped a meeting with Nuns and then posted the recording to a public blog should be of concern to Council in light of the Gurmant Grewal affair.
The secret taping of this meeting by the GPC either speaks to amateurism or clumsy deviousness. To then invite an unnecessary, no-win debate by posting the audio recording to a GPC strategist’s blog simply reveals inexperience of the worst kind and reemphasizes the need for professional, experienced campaign staff.
While Joe Trippi offers many tactical approaches related to internet campaigning without political discipline the party risks devoting significant resources to managing an activity that will produce little in the way of political reward while exposing the party to significant political risk.
From Elio Di Iorio’s 2006 personal blog "...Seniors and baby-boomers are influencing policy, and youth are not. That's a problem. So you are paying for their drugs and diapers. They make us chase youth around, busting them for noise, pot, beer, skateboarding, whatever ... busting grow-ops while their viagra, celebrex and other pharmaceuticals come at the cost of your post-secondary education."
Elio Di Iorio lost his bid for reelection by 29 votes.
From the Globe & Mail (3 January 2007) Blogs are not private diaries. There's always the possibility that someone might actually take what you have to say to heart. There's always the chance that what you write might cause someone to decide not to read a particular book, hire a particular individual or invite someone to their party. A blog is an inconsequential space with consequences. All I ask is that bloggers occasionally stop and remind themselves that the person they're writing about is not only real, but perfectly capable of typing his name into a search engine. Remember bloggers: We're out there. And if we know what's good for us, we're paying attention.
Recommendation: Internet campaigning is important, but only as one tactic of many. Scarce party resources must be proportionately allocated between various campaign efforts and not focused on a single tactic.
5.6 Volunteers
The backbone of all campaigns is volunteers. However, the party is now at the stage where volunteers need to be directed to local and regional campaigns. The central campaign should have the right to choose the best volunteers as required, but can not be expected to supervise large numbers of volunteers as it runs the central campaign. The party must also remember that even the best volunteers require professional supervision.
Recommendation: The personal relationships that must develop and exist during an election campaign internally and externally do not permit a volunteer-based central campaign. If it is not already factored in to the campaign budget, sufficient central staff must be available to direct and run the central campaign.
6. Conclusion
Polls go up and polls go down. For comparison and historical purposes, it might be helpful for Council to consider the 2005 polling numbers from Strategic Counsel (see 7.3):
- April 2005 10%
- June 2005 9%
- October 2005 8%
- November 2005 8%
Last month, the Green Party polled 7 per cent with Strategic Counsel, as it did in the last week of the 2006 campaign. In May and June 2006 the party was at 9 per cent, as it was a year earlier. If the party hopes to capitalize on pre-election polling results, it must – as this report discusses – develop its ground campaign, refine and communicate its message, adopt best practices in its decision making, and ensure that plans are developed on sound analysis and not wishful thinking or biased inputs.
After much reflection, I chose recently to allow my membership and financial support of the party to lapse, as sadly others have as well. I’m conflicted over renewing, but I do hope that the Green Party is successful in the upcoming election as I trust this report will demonstrate.
The party continues to face many challenges. While there have been some notable successes, I had hoped to see more progress particularly in membership development and fundraising. This is even more true given the nearly $4 million in public funding the party has received. When I resigned as Campaign Manager in November 2005, I stated privately to the then Chair of Council that I was extremely concerned over the party’s lack of professionalism and the frequent lack of employing best practices in its decision making at all levels of the party.
Some may read this report as criticism of certain individuals. This would be a mistake. My goal – dating to my support for the Green Party of British Columbia in 1996 – has always been to support the advancement of the party’s values and policies.
For the countless volunteers who have given of their time in promoting the party, a simple ‘thanks’ will never suffice. Whether it’s members of Council giving of their time and expertise, staff pulling off minor miracles despite a severe lack of resources, or canvassers going door-to-door during last winter’s election, each must be honoured and valued for their commitment to the party, its values and policies.
I am highly impressed by the success and promise that Elizabeth has had and will have in communicating the party’s message.
I look forward to the day when our party has the resources to provide 307 other candidates with the support Elizabeth found in London North Centre. Like you, I realize time is short and the need is great.
Thank you for your work to date on Council and your volunteerism.
7. Appendix
7.1 A fully qualified identified candidate must include their name, address, telephone number, email address, web site photo, biography, signed intent letter, campaign manager and financial agent.
7.2 Ground campaign refers specifically to the local riding effort. A competitive campaign will require at the very least 200 volunteers and a budget of over $50,000.
7.3 See: http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls.asp
Recommendations:
